Indonesia is simultaneously expanding military cooperation with the United States and its partners through the Super Garuda Shield 2026 exercise while maintaining separate defense engagements with China and Russia. The overlapping activities have drawn attention to Jakarta’s longstanding policy of maintaining strategic flexibility rather than aligning itself with a particular major power.
Super Garuda Shield 2026 officially began on August 31 and will run until September 11, involving 4,743 military personnel from 21 countries. The exercise is being conducted at several locations across Indonesia, including Bandung, Jakarta, Lampung, South Sumatra and North Kalimantan.
Super Garuda Shield has developed from a bilateral Indonesia-US military exercise into a large multinational training program. The 2026 edition involves Indonesia, the United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, India and other partner countries.
According to the Indonesian military, the exercise is intended to strengthen interoperability, operational readiness, defense diplomacy and the ability of participating forces to work together in responding to security and humanitarian challenges.
TNI Commander General Agus Subiyanto said the exercise involves 12 training areas. Among them are cyber defense, combined military operations and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
The United States has also deployed military capabilities for the exercise, including HIMARS rocket systems and C-17 Globemaster aircraft. Indonesian and US special forces conducted an airborne assault simulation in Lampung on September 1.
US officials have described Super Garuda Shield as an important platform for improving readiness and interoperability among Indonesia, the United States and other participating countries.
Indonesia's closer military cooperation with Washington does not mean Jakarta has stopped developing defense relations with Beijing.
Indonesia and China are preparing to hold another joint military exercise, known as Heping Garuda, around September or October 2026. Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin said the exercise is expected to take place in the Sumatra region, although the exact location had not been finalized at the time of his statement.
The exercise is intended to facilitate military cooperation, including personnel exchanges and the sharing of capabilities between the two countries. Sjafrie said Heping Garuda would involve Indonesia and China.
The two countries have also discussed broader defense-industrial cooperation, including technology transfer and the development of defense-related manufacturing capabilities in Indonesia.
In August, Indonesia and China also increased military engagement following a meeting between their defense ministers in Jakarta.
Russia represents another major power with which Indonesia continues to maintain defense relations.
In August 2026, the Indonesian Navy's KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai conducted a passing exercise with the Chinese Navy's frigate Honghe east of Taiwan while the Indonesian warship was returning from training in Russia.
The activity involved maritime communications, formation maneuvers and replenishment at sea. Indonesia described the encounter as a routine passing exercise rather than an indication of a change in its strategic alignment.
Indonesia has also conducted military exercises with Russia. The two countries previously held the Orruda joint naval exercise, while defense cooperation between Jakarta and Moscow has continued through military diplomacy and exchanges.
The simultaneous expansion of Indonesia's military cooperation with the United States, China and Russia illustrates the complexity of Jakarta's foreign and defense policy.
On one side, Super Garuda Shield has become increasingly extensive and sophisticated, involving thousands of personnel and numerous countries. The United States remains Indonesia's most prominent military exercise partner through the annual program.
On the other side, Indonesia is developing separate military cooperation mechanisms with China and maintaining defense relations with Russia.
This approach is broadly consistent with Indonesia's longstanding "free and active" foreign policy, which seeks to preserve strategic autonomy and avoid becoming formally aligned with a particular power bloc.
The Jakarta Post reported that Indonesia has sought to maintain relations with both Washington and Beijing while expanding its defense cooperation with various countries.
The existence of military exercises with competing major powers does not, by itself, establish that Indonesia has chosen to align with one side.
Indonesia's participation in Super Garuda Shield does not formally make it a US ally, while planned exercises with China and continued defense engagement with Russia do not automatically indicate that Jakarta is moving into a Chinese- or Russian-led security bloc.
An analysis by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute similarly argued that Indonesia's military engagement with China should not automatically be interpreted as a strategic shift toward Beijing. The analysis noted that Jakarta continues to conduct military cooperation with China while simultaneously deepening defense cooperation with the United States, Australia, Japan and other partners.
The broader pattern suggests that Indonesia is seeking to maximize its defense options rather than limiting cooperation to a single group of countries.
For Jakarta, military exercises provide opportunities to improve capabilities, exchange knowledge, strengthen interoperability and develop defense diplomacy. At the same time, maintaining relations with multiple major powers gives Indonesia greater room to maneuver amid increasing strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.
Indonesia's approach therefore cannot be understood solely through the lens of US-China rivalry. Its simultaneous engagement with Washington, Beijing and Moscow reflects an effort to preserve strategic autonomy while strengthening the country's defense capabilities.
Super Garuda Shield 2026, the planned Heping Garuda exercise with China and Indonesia's continuing defense relationship with Russia demonstrate the increasingly diverse nature of Jakarta's military diplomacy.
While the simultaneous activities are taking place against a backdrop of heightened geopolitical competition, available information does not establish that Indonesia has abandoned its non-aligned approach. Instead, the developments indicate that Jakarta continues to pursue defense cooperation with multiple major powers while retaining strategic flexibility.
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